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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently developing 
options for an Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) that expands human presence from Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) into the solar system and to the surface of Mars. The Hybrid in-space 
transportation architecture is one option being investigated within the EMC. The architecture 
enables return of the entire in-space propulsion stage and habitat to cis-lunar space after a 
round trip to Mars. This concept of operations opens the door for a fully reusable Mars 
transportation system from cis-lunar space to a Mars parking orbit and back.  
This paper explores the reuse of in-space transportation systems, with a focus on the 
propulsion systems. It begins by examining why reusability should be pursued and defines 
reusability in space-flight context. A range of functions and enablers associated with 
preparing a system for reuse are identified and a vision for reusability is proposed that can be 
advanced and implemented as new capabilities are developed. Following this, past reusable 
spacecraft and servicing capabilities, as well as those currently in development are discussed. 
Using the Hybrid transportation architecture as an example, an assessment of the degree of 
reusability that can be incorporated into the architecture with current capabilities is provided 
and areas for development are identified that will enable greater levels of reuse in the future. 
Implications and implementation challenges specific to the architecture are also presented. 
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HPS  = Hybrid Propulsion System 
Isp  = Specific Impulse 
ISRU  = In Situ Resource Utilization 
ISS  = International Space Station 
LDHEO = Lunar-Distance High Earth Orbit 
LDRO  = Lunar-Distance Retrograde Orbit 
LGA  = Lunar Gravity Assist 
MMH  = Monomethyl Hydrazine 
NASA  = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NTO  = Nitrogen Tetroxide 
OMS  = Orbital Maneuvering System 
OPF  = Orbiter Processing Facility 
PMD  = Propellant Management Device 
R2  = Robonaut 2 
RCS  = Reaction Control System 
RRM  = Robotic Refueling Mission 
SEP  = Solar Electric Propulsion 
SSME  = Space Shuttle Main Engines 
STS  = Space Transportation System 
TLI  = Trans-Lunar Injection 
UDMH = Unsymmetrical Di-methyl Hydrazine 
 
I. Introduction 
S humans strive to extend out into the solar system on multi-year missions far beyond low Earth orbit and make 
repeated visits to the same locations, the potential for incorporating reusable systems into the spaceflight 
architectures needs to be understood and their potential impact on exploration campaigns assessed. This paper presents 
a vision for reusability in spaceflight, discusses needed capabilities and challenges that must be overcome to enable 
increasing degrees of reusability and achieve that vision, and examines past and current attempts at reusable systems 
to better understand the degree of reusability that can likely be achieved in the near term. Using a general set of broadly 
applicable reusability functions, this paper covers an investigation of the capabilities needed to prepare systems for 
reuse between missions and identifies several key challenges that limit or prohibit reusability of some systems. 
Capability gaps and challenges provide insight into the types of investments that can enable higher degrees of 
reusability and promote implementation of reusable architectures.  
 While beginning with a general discussion on reusability, the particular focus of this paper is on the viability of 
incorporating reusability into the Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) and identifying those capabilities that would 
particularly benefit EMC architectures. The EMC is an ongoing NASA study investigating potential options and key 
decision points to enable crewed Mars missions beginning in the mid-2030s timeframe that lead to pioneering and 
eventual human settlement.  The EMC follows a flexible strategy that leverages existing capabilities to facilitate near-
term exploration while developing a portfolio of evolving capabilities that provide specific functions to solve 
challenges associated with extending human presence, thus enabling more complex operations over time. One of 
strategic principles of the EMC is to develop multi-use, evolvable space infrastructure, minimizing unique major 
developments, with each mission leaving something behind to support subsequent missions.1   
The EMC Hybrid architecture was investigated to assess the implications and viability of incorporating reusability 
into a specific EMC mission architecture. The Hybrid architecture is one of two transportation system options being 
assessed in 2015 under the EMC.2 The architecture is built around a hybrid propulsion system that combines both 
solar electric propulsion and a chemical propulsion system into a single transportation stage. The propulsion stage 
design is the same for both crew and cargo delivery. In a reusable instantiation of the Hybrid architecture, a small fleet 
of hybrid stages are produced that all return to Earth vicinity at the completion of the mission for refurbishment and 
resupply in preparation for the next mission. In addition to the propulsion stage, the transit habitat for the crew is also 
reused.3 While both propulsion and habitation modules are reused in the architecture, this paper focuses on reusability 
of the propulsion module. The high-level functions presented in the general discussion provide background for 
examining the capability needs and challenges associated with incorporating reusability into the Hybrid architecture. 
The degree of reusability that can reasonably be achieved with current capabilities in the Hybrid architecture is 
discussed and the near-term developments that can enhance or enable use of reusable systems are identified. The paper 
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closes with a broader look at an approach to advance the evolution of reusability and servicing capabilities to achieve 
a vision of spaceflight where the systems exhibit a level of reusability akin to aircraft today. 
II. Why Reusability? 
The introduction of reusable systems into a space architecture provides opportunities not only for the EMC, but 
also for the future development of space. Within a campaign such as the EMC, reusable systems provide value for 
both in-space systems and destination systems. Incorporating reusable in-space transportation systems, such as 
propulsion modules and transit habitats, reduces the need to launch replacement systems, thus either reducing the 
number of launches or providing opportunities to launch other payloads. While both expendable and reusable 
architectures result in a collection of in-space assets that must be dispositioned after completion of their primary 
mission, there is a distinct difference between the two architectures. The hardware for disposal in expendable 
architectures typically includes expensive, human-rated propulsion stages and habitation modules that have robust 
designs capable of surviving multi-year journeys to Mars. In a reusable architecture, however, the remaining systems 
are primarily logistics modules and tankers that have a shorter design life and generally do not need to be human rated, 
and are thus less expensive to develop and produce. 
Destination architectures also benefit from the ability to reuse major surface systems like habitats and pressurized 
rovers, particularly when crews begin to visit the same location over several missions. Reusing major systems enables 
the delivery of other payloads that can further expand capabilities at Mars, facilitating pioneering efforts and 
progression from an initial emplacement phase through a Mars surface proving ground to utilization.4 Lessons gained 
from early incorporation of reusability into in-space systems can be leveraged by the surface systems. Similarly, 
distance to Mars and lack of access to surface systems between missions present challenges to long-duration operation 
and reuse of surface systems, and will drive development of advanced capabilities that will facilitate reusability and 
servicing of in-space assets, as well. 
To support a reusable EMC architecture, new systems must be introduced to resupply transportation assets and 
ferry new payloads to aggregate with transportation stacks. The need for, and availability of, such assets provides an 
initial capability that can be leveraged to build in-space servicing and manufacturing infrastructure, eventually 
reducing dependence on Earth-based launch of systems and materials. The initial need to refuel and resupply 
transportation elements provides an early opportunity for commercial and international partnerships to provide these 
critical services. With an initial customer base provided by the EMC, the experience gained by providers can lead to 
growth of servicing capabilities and the development of new technologies and capabilities that increase the degree of 
reusability of space systems. 
Over time, repurposed assets such as retired transportation stages and emptied logistics and fuel modules can be 
aggregated together to form the basis of in-space supply points, which could be restocked either from Earth or with 
space-based resources, or they can provide the building blocks of infrastructure to facilitate servicing reusable systems 
between missions. They could also be broken down into resources themselves to provide feedstock for space-based 
manufacturing. 
III. What Does it Mean to be Reusable? 
A. Defining Reusable 
For the purposes of this study and paper, reusability is: 
The ability to use a system for multiple missions without the need for replacement of systems or 
subsystems. Ideally, only replenishment of consumable commodities (propellant and gas 
products, for instance) occurs between missions. 
B. Phases and Functions Associated With the “Reset” of Space Vehicles 
There are three stages associated with the reset period: arrival operations, space vehicle re-assembly and servicing 
operations, and departure operations. Within these three timeframes of activity, a variety of functions may be required 
depending on the achieved degree of reusability. The team has identified a list of potential reusability functions that 
are broadly applicable to a variety of reusable systems and architectures. As the functions required to reset a system 
depend on the system’s purpose, operations, and associated technologies, it is neither necessary nor expected that all 
of these functions will be performed for any given system. This generic function list, considered for each candidate 
approach, is depicted in Figure 1.  
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As stated in the Vision for Reusability detailed below, between arrival and departure a reusable system should strive 
for simple operations that only offload delivered crew and cargo items and take on a new load of propellants, cargo, 
and crew supplies. However, no matter how well the spacecraft design is planned, some degree of refurbishment, 
repair, and verification will be required. All of these activities must be addressed during the reset period. 
C. Vision for Reusability as an Enabler for Pioneering Operations in Space 
Envisioning space operations that pioneer healthy, sustainable growth in human activities over the long term must 
include greater space system reusability. The following nine-point vision provides a point of departure for organizing 
major technical goals and objectives for achieving the benefits of reusability—which are critical to achieving the 
vision for pioneering space—within the context of a campaign of pioneering journeys to Mars. The specific points 
emerge from insight gained during decades of previous space achievements, as well as from on-going research and 
analysis activity in space operations and support. It is also inspired by early investigations into innovative Mars 
mission campaigns intended to evolve into a state of pioneering and settlement on the surface of Mars, as well as its 
moons. Furthermore, it has been inspired by requests to investigate the reuse of many key elements required in 
pursuing such visionary campaigns.   
 
1. Provide a simplified, very-highly automated architecture of space flight vehicles enabling minimum 
periodic and repetitive maintenance (airplane-like) and resultant short vehicle reset time between 
missions. 
2. Design-in performance margins and flight hardware allowances to reduce or eliminate unplanned 
reset work, i.e., strive to design-out and eliminate sources of unscheduled repairs and associated 
tasks. 
3. Strive to isolate external space vehicle support operations from dependence on specialized, unique 
space facilities, support systems, and equipment. At the same time, maximize use of common in situ 
resources and support systems. Routine, scheduled space vehicle turnaround should replenish 
consumables only and thus avoid vehicle reset operations becoming a time-consuming, labor-
intensive, infrastructure-intensive engineering effort. 
4. Incorporate advanced automation and robotic capabilities that inform the operator only of the 
required corrective actions needed prior to the next mission. Avoid designs that lead to 
requirements for complex functional tests, and let the space vehicle communicate with the operator 
remotely during the activity in which ever domain he or she may reside. Incorporation of special 
engineering instrumentation will be used on specifically designated technology demonstration 
vehicles in space “proving ground” environments only, similar to the developmental 
instrumentation that was incorporated on Space Shuttle Orbiter OV-102 (Columbia). Satisfaction 
of proving ground certification criteria will remove the requirement on operational space vehicles. 
5. Strive to validate hardware and software design complexity prior to proving ground-phase 
deployment and verify not only system performance, but also major reductions in space operations 
in the proving ground environments. Demonstrate that opportunities for “hands-on” activities are 
Figure 1. General functions for preparing space systems for reuse. 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
5 
nearly eliminated. If successfully demonstrated, this will mean far fewer opportunities for human 
error to exist during 1,000-day-class missions and permanent space facility occupation. 
6. Employ highly autonomous support system management planning in all domains—ground, in-
space, and surface environments—and at the highest architectural levels achievable. Focus on 
automatic, on-demand scheduling of space vehicle activity, support system and equipment 
operation, as well as sustaining affordable and productive supply chains—extending from the Earth 
to a growing human presence in lunar-planetary space. 
7. Promote and adopt common packaging interfaces to assure maximum flexibility, productivity, and 
affordability for exchange of personnel and material to and from a variety of space destinations 
and delivery waypoints. The most affordable and productive elements of space architectures will 
be blind to the cargo and personnel needs which they carry; like today’s commercial transportation 
on the ground, on the sea, and in the air. Keep in check the impacts of payload package uniqueness 
so that accumulation of space system support infrastructure does not become burdensome. The 
accumulation of burdensome infrastructure relative to the in-space population and cargo 
throughput will slow productivity and add cost to the various pioneers, settlers, and their financial 
sponsors. 
8. Incorporate a level of component commonality that allows for the potential exchange of hardware 
between systems in the event of component failure, while not inflicting a burdensome level of 
commonality that adversely affects the functional capabilities of the systems. 
9. Exploration and prospecting form the foundation for pioneering. Pioneering systems are designed 
to grow at the destinations and are there to be used by pioneers and settlers—and not necessarily 
for exclusive use by scientists and engineers. The role of science and engineering during the 
pioneering and settlement phases will be to perform further research, expanded explorations, 
continuous improvement at the destinations, and technology advancement for future market-driven 
needs and government requirements. 
 
It is important to note that achieving the vision of full reusability will not happen immediately given the state of 
current capabilities and technologies. New capabilities and technologies that facilitate reuse will need to be developed 
and incorporated in a manner that benefits the overall campaign. However, designing near-term systems for an 
achievable level of reuse and then operating those systems provides valuable lessons that, along with advancing 
technologies and new capabilities, will enable systems to evolve to a greater degree of reusability over time. 
D. The Importance of Retaining Functional Integrity between Uses 
Reusable systems, in practice, can exhibit large variations in time and expense between reuses. The degree of 
variation depends heavily on how well the functional integrity of the vehicle is retained between missions; i.e., the 
vehicle, its elements, and its systems drive the time and expense involved in the reset, or turnaround, activity required. 
What is functional integrity, however, and can it be improved by design, or through advances in technology?  
Regardless of where the reset may occur, when a fully operational vehicle arrives at a location to be reset for next 
use, its system functions should remain intact without any disconnections, degradation, or otherwise loss of “integrity” 
of what had been verified and established with confidence prior to its last use.  
If it can be established, through repeated use, that a vehicle retains its functional integrity without requiring 
replacement or repair of various components or functional paths, then there is engineering confidence in reusing the 
system efficiently. If however, unplanned repair and associated tasks are routinely encountered between every use, 
then there is likely to be a general lack of confidence, and additional time and effort will be required to re-establish 
functional integrity and recertify the system between missions.  
While this degree of confidence may seem unreasonable in this era of infrequent Mars exploration missions, 
tomorrow’s pioneering activity will, nevertheless, require a greater pace of activity, and thus greater confidence in 
system reuse. With this in mind, the proving ground concept allows for engineering improvements in a fix, fly, and fix 
again development approach, and will provide us the opportunity to build in the degree of system functional integrity 
retention required. 
In more specific system engineering terms, between missions an ideal reusable space vehicle retains the following:  
 Structural integrity—structural elements, assemblies, and members remain undisturbed and without 
component replacement. No disassembly or unacceptable conditions, such as: corrosion, erosion, 
punctures and dents, fractures and cracks, or loose structural connections require repair. In a robust 
design, many of these degradation conditions are accommodated between uses, or between extended 
periods of use.  
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 Mechanical integrity—movable assemblies, such as articulating solar arrays, retain their functional 
integrity without component replacement or intrusive servicing and maintenance (such as calibrations, 
adjustments, disconnections and re-riggings, lubrications, etc.)  
 Fluid integrity—propellant and gas commodities in the propulsion system, as well as fluids and gases in 
other vehicle systems (such as thermal management and environmental control hardware) remain “leak 
tight”. No component replacements occur with fluid connections. If any of the commodity has been 
consumed during its flight use, then full functional integrity is retained when it is replenished through a 
simple external connection; i.e., without disconnecting vehicle elements, or otherwise disturbing fluid 
line transfer paths (tubes, hoses, flex lines, etc.), and other filtration devices, fluid vessels, and fluid 
system components. Doing so allows opportunities for seal disturbance, contamination, or undesired 
entrainment. Once a fluid line—particularly pressurized fluid lines—are disconnected, they require even 
more effort to re-service and to re-establish a useful operational state. 
 Electrical/electronic integrity—electrical power, signal, and remote wireless connections remain 
undisturbed between missions. For electrical and signal path integrity to be fully retained, no connectors 
are de-mated and re-mated, and no intrusive calibrations or adjustments requiring disconnections for 
externally connected support equipment are required. Additionally, no short circuit or open circuit 
conditions require repair. 
 Software integrity—on-board flight code remains intact and able to support the next use without the need 
of special vehicle system operation to verify software change functionality. Changes and upgrades to 
software may be accommodated, but system operation beyond otherwise normal system functional tests 
are not required by the software changes. 
 
While the above list identifies an ideal that should be strived for, in reality any man-made object has limitations 
and could break unexpectedly, especially in the harsh environments of launch and space, which means that systems 
will inevitably experience a break in functional integrity.   Additionally, the degree to which functional integrity can 
be maintained during reset is highly dependent on the system technologies and servicing capabilities available. As 
technologies and capabilities advance, the degree to which functional integrity is maintained will also increase. As 
much as possible, design decisions for reusable systems should be made to minimize the extent and impact of breaks 
in functional integrity, e.g., choosing to use modular, “plug-and-play”-type line replaceable units instead of selecting 
options requiring intrusive component-level repairs. A trade must be made to balance the mass penalties that may be 
incurred by selecting less mass-efficient design solutions against the time and effort saved on repair and retesting 
activities and the reduced risk of collateral damage provided by solutions that retain greater functional integrity. 
E. Degrees of Reuse 
There are many degrees of reuse that span the range from ideal single element “gas-n-go” reusability, to a single 
use expendable system. Partially reusable system designs come in many forms: 
 Multi-element/multi-stage space transfer vehicles may have elements that are reused and elements that 
are expended. Elements that are recovered for reuse may require extensive teardown, or even 
remanufacturing. Such was the case for the ocean recovered Solid Rocket Boosters of the Space Shuttle 
program. Upon recovery there was very little functional integrity retained between flights. 
 A vehicle element may be reused, but major assemblies or modules of the element are expended, such as 
an expended fuel bottle. If cleverly designed, for example a “plug-and-play” module with a minimum of 
connections, such systems might lose very little system functional integrity. On the other hand, if reuse 
is not a clear design objective, a design may be fielded with many critical functions coming apart or 
degrading between missions. 
 A vehicle element may be fully reusable, but a number of components must be replaced based on time in 
service or number of cycles; such as a pressure vessel that is life-limited to a certified number of pressure 
cycles.  
 A vehicle may have a degree of “expendability” due to frequent component failures and unplanned 
removals. 
IV. Summary of Historic Flight and Ground Servicing of Space Vehicles 
To date, there has been limited experience with the reuse of space systems. Satellites and deep space probes have 
demonstrated long lifetimes in space, many operating continuously for more than 15 years without servicing. Long 
lifetimes have been achieved in this case through design approaches that emphasize simplicity, redundancy, and the 
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use of long-life components. Once launched, these systems do not regularly experience environments, such as 
vibrational, detrimental to component life. There are few mechanical components to wear out, with most being passive 
in nature. Propulsion systems utilized are either hydrazine-based, low-thrust chemical types (typically mono-
propellant in low Earth orbit and bi-propellant for geosynchronous orbit and deep space), or long-duration electric 
types. Operations for these satellites and probes usually end when propellants have been depleted. Therefore, the reuse 
of space systems, at a minimum, requires servicing to replenish propellants and other consumables. At most, it may 
also require repair and/or replacement of failed, failing, or limited-life components.  
The following sections present experiences and lessons learned from several spacecraft operations and capability 
development and demonstrations relevant to servicing and reusability. Additional examples beyond those included in 
this paper may provide additional insights relevant to reusable design. 
A. Space Propulsion Reusability Experience 
The Mir space station, the International Space Station, and the Space Shuttle are examples of operational designs 
that included reusable propulsion systems for multi-mission or extended flight operations. The transfer of propellants 
has been limited to the hypergolic family of propellants used in pressure-fed propulsion systems. However there have 
been numerous studies of potential architectures that use cryogenic propellant transfer, the most notable being those 
considered in the early Apollo architecture studies that looked at transfer of propellant into the Saturn V rocket while 
on orbit,5 as well as several recent studies investigating propellant depots.6,7 Recently there have also been several 
activities that are developing the new technologies needed for the next generation of reusable space propulsion 
systems.  
 
1. Progress Module, Mir (1986-2001) and International Space Station (1998-Present)  
The Soviet/Russian space station Mir used the propulsion systems on both visiting Progress resupply modules and 
several of the station modules for orbit station keeping. The Progress module had the capability to transfer hypergolic 
propellants (unsymmetrical di-methyl hydrazine [UDMH] and nitrogen tetroxide [NTO]) onto the Mir modules. The 
philosophy of the Mir station-keeping propulsion was to have several modules capable of orbit reboost in addition to 
the Progress module. The Progress M module used with Mir, and similarly the Progress M-1 module used to resupply 
the International Space Station (ISS), uses pressurized propellant transfer with the propellants contained in collapsible 
bellows to separate the propellant fluids from pressurant gases. This method is very effective and no major failures 
have occurred with the propellant transfer, demonstrating both the viability of pressure-fed transfer and the success of 
single-fault tolerant systems, however it also requires that propellant quantities in the tank remain above 50% to extend 
the life of the bellows. The International Space Station has made extensive use of propellant resupply from Progress 
modules with over 50 successful resupply missions to ISS.   
Several important lessons have been learned from Progress Module propellant transfer on both Mir and ISS. 
Careful purging procedures of propellant transfer lines is required to prevent frozen propellants in the lines. The highly 
corrosive nature of NTO can cause material degradation and requires the use of special alloys that are resistant to the 
rapid oxidation caused by NTO. The highly oxidizing NTO can also cause metallic oxidation “salts” to clog 
downstream filters. This precipitation can be exacerbated as NTO temperature decreases, which can occur during 
transfer if the thermal environment is not adequately managed on both sides of the transfer. During ISS refueling, 
thermal control in the propellant lines is exclusively via heat conduction through the resupply vehicle’s structural 
shell. Other methods may be necessary to maintain adequate thermal control to reduce precipitation in deep space 
vehicles.  
Both hydrazine-based fuels and NTO are highly toxic to humans. Russians perform stringent component leak tests 
on the ground and rely on these to justify only a gross leak check before flowing propellant when mated to client. 
Contamination can still occur, however, and substantial keep-out zones are required around rocket engine exhausts 
and vents during extra-vehicular activity to prevent EVA suit contamination being introduced into the interior of the 
spacecraft.  
 
2. Hydrazine Transfer Experiment on STS-41G 
The first demonstration of American technology for orbital refuel occurred with the Orbital Refueling System 
Flight Demonstration on STS-41G. During the demonstration, an EVA crew connected a hydrazine transfer line 
between a simulated tanker and Landsat-type propulsion system interface. Both simulated systems incorporated 
diaphragm tanks, which were identical to the shuttle auxiliary power unit tanks. Special tools and procedures were 
developed to maintain a minimum of two seals between the crew and propellant during mating to protect the crew 
from exposure and contamination on the spacesuits. Propellant was then transferred back and forth between the two 
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simulated systems multiple times to demonstrate control of ullage gas recompression temperatures during refueling 
so that the temperatures did not reach the hydrazine decomposition temperature (200º F). 8 
 
3. Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System and Reaction 
Control System (OMS/RCS) 
The Space Shuttle OMS/RCS (Figure 2) is an example of 
space hardware reusability and the robustness of hypergolic 
propellant propulsion systems. The Orbital Maneuvering 
Engines (OME) were designed to be capable of 100 missions, 
1000 starts in space, and 15 hours of total burn time. No major 
failures were experienced in flight, although the system did 
experience component failures and propellant leaks caused by 
such factors as iron nitrate build-up, contamination, and filter 
clogging that reduced performance, imposed operational 
constraints, and required servicing when back on the ground. 
To minimize leakage of propellant and pressurant (and to protect ground personnel from potential exposure), the 
OMS/RCS incorporated redundant seals wherever possible, in series, between interior and exterior surfaces.  
 
4. Recent Developments for Reusable Propulsion Systems 
a) Orbital Express 
In 2007 a successful in-space demonstration of autonomous servicing 
capabilities for a “cooperative” spacecraft and servicing vehicle designed 
specifically for resupply of hydrazine propellant was performed by the 
Orbital Express Project Astro and NextSat vehicles9 (Figure 3). The 
demonstration included automated rendezvous and docking (AR&D), 
transfer of fluid, precise gauging of fluid transfer, and transfer of non-
propellant hardware including batteries and a computer. The propellant 
transfer demonstrated the use of propellant management devices (PMDs) to 
separate gases and liquids in the propellant tanks, proving that transfer of 
fuel can be accomplished without a bellows system. The propellant transfer 
demonstration accomplished multiple dockings and scenarios. 
 
b) NASA Technology Efforts 
NASA is currently working on key technologies that will enable automated or remote servicing of Earth satellites. 
The Robotic Refueling Mission (RRM) successfully performed initial experiments with in-space robotic refueling 
using ethanol on the International Space Station. More recently, the Remote Robotic Oxidizer Transfer Test 
successfully completed the ground-based demonstration of a remotely operated robotic system for servicing NTO 
oxidizer.  A robotic arm at Kennedy Space Center was remotely controlled from Goddard Space Flight Center to make 
connections to a simulated client fluid transfer interface port, simulating the data and video latency of communication 
with an orbiting satellite. The on-orbit propellant servicing work steps were then simulated by performing interface 
leak checks, transferring propellant across the interface, depressurizing, and then disconnecting from the interface. 
NASA is also beginning early-stage development of xenon refuel technologies. 
B. Space Systems Servicing Experience 
Beyond the propulsion systems, the ability to service the entire spacecraft must be taken into account for reusable 
systems. Whereas spacecraft such as the Space Shuttle have been serviced on the ground between missions, reusable 
in-space systems will need to be serviced and resupplied for subsequent missions while remaining in space. In addition 
to the examples of capabilities supporting reusability for propulsion systems above, similar historical and current 
examples of servicing capabilities exist that are applicable to extending the life of the overall space system. 
 
1. Space Shuttle Orbiter 
With its long operational history and many lessons learned, the Space Shuttle Orbiter provides a wealth of 
experience with reusability that can be draw on. Although the Orbiter’s operating environment, especially with launch 
and reentry, is more extreme than a space-based interplanetary transit vehicle will encounter, the Shuttle’s reuse 
experience can still provide insights for future development and servicing of reusable in-space transportation systems.  
Figure 3. Multifunction tool removes 
plug during Robotic Refueling Mission. 
Figure 2. Space Shuttle forward RCS and aft OMS 
pod. 
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The Orbiter fleet included five vehicles that operated 135 missions over its 30-year flight program. In that time, 
Orbiter Discovery (OV-103) was reused the most, flying thirty-nine (39) orbital space missions from 1984 to 2011. 
Two Orbiters, Challenger (OV-099) and Columbia (OV-102) were tragically lost after suffering catastrophic failures. 
The Columbia accident in particular, which may have been mitigated were an in-space diagnosis and repair capability 
available, indicates the types of flexible contingency in-space servicing capabilities that future reusable vehicles may 
require. 
When preparing the Orbiters between missions, a 
typical turnaround “template” allotted 126 days from 
roll-in to one of three Orbiter Processing Facilities 
(OPFs) to lift-off (Figure 4).  This consisted of 93 days 
for Orbiter turn-around and 7 days for Orbiter 
integration with the Solid Rocket Boosters and External 
Tank on the Mobile Launch Platform, after which the 
vehicle “stack” was transported to the launch pad.  
There, a 26-day stay was typically planned for the 
vehicle to connect to pad services, install the payload, 
arm the ordnance devices, perform launch countdown 
preparations and conduct the actual launch countdown to 
begin the flight execution10. 
On a periodic basis each Orbiter would undergo a 
more extensive depot maintenance period, referred to as Orbiter Maintenance Depot Period, where detailed structural 
inspections and major component removals were required by the vehicle manufacturer and design centers. Following 
these periods the OPF processing time usually doubled due to the overall Orbiter functional integrity and closeout 
state not fully representing that of a vehicle returning directly from a space flight. 
Although initially intended to achieve high flight rates, the actual achieved flight rate, which was driven by the 
extensive amount of work required between missions, was limited. Following the STS-51L loss of Challenger (OV-
099), the fleet of four Orbiters (Columbia, Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour) reached a stable flight rate average of 
7 to 8 flights per year during the 1990s, prior to International Space Station (ISS) construction period. During the ISS 
construction phase, and after re-establishing “routine” operations following the loss of OV-102 Columbia, a flight rate 
of about 5 per year was demonstrated with the three-Orbiter fleet. 
Ground turnaround operations were based on requirements defined in an Operations and Maintenance 
Requirements and Specifications Document that were managed and controlled by the appropriate design agency 
(Rockwell International and NASA JSC for the Orbiter, for example).  These requirements were then satisfied through 
execution of a series of planned procedures that were scheduled according to the configuration of the previous mission 
and the needs of the up-coming mission. Depending on the nature and design of the systems involved, the planned 
ground turnaround procedures were executed either remotely from the Launch Control Center through automated 
software procedures, onboard from the Orbiter’s flight deck and on-board control screens, or onsite in the OPF at one 
of three maintenance stations within the facility (forward, mid-body, and aft shops). Many procedures required a 
combination of both locally and remotely executed tasks. 
Typical tasks in the OPF included tile repair; payload bay reconfiguration; visual inspections; cleaning; 
component/system functional testing; calibrations; and local fluid and gas servicing equipment operation. In addition 
to the OPF, off-line supporting repair and maintenance facilities, equipment, and services were needed, such as for 
the Forward RCS and aft OMS/RCS pods at the Hypergolic Maintenance Facility, an “engine shop” for the Space 
Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), and a “tile shop” for fabrication of repair of thermal protection system components. 
Each SSME was routinely removed, which required intrusive operations into the aft propulsion structure, 
establishing access platforms and installing drag-on equipment, oxygen monitoring and lighting for personnel, as well 
as the removal operations itself. This drove added “closeout” work to reconfigure disconnected and disassembled 
components and subassemblies prior to reflight. Any work requiring component removal and replacement was 
typically invasive and not at all achievable during flight. Any vehicle intentionally designed to have components 
replaced in space will need an extensive amount of detailed engineering and thought to simplify servicing operations, 
maximize retention of functional integrity, and reduce the risk of collateral damage.  
Figure 4. Space Shuttle Orbiter in the Orbiter Processing 
Facility 
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Despite its operational robustness, the Space Shuttle OMS was never designed as an in-space-serviceable system. 
Although minor troubleshooting could be performed on orbit, such as the removal of the gap filler on STS-114, more 
serious issues had to be addressed during ground servicing.  OMS/RCS propellant servicing was a complex and highly 
integrated task that typically occurred 
about two to six weeks before launch 
at the launch pad. It took about six to 
ten days to prepare the ground 
support equipment and orbiter for 
servicing, and the timeline for 
OMS/RCS servicing operations was 
on average about 30 hours in length. 
Over the final 41 processing flows, 
there was never a flow in which there 
were no problems related to the flight 
OMS/RCS or servicing GSE as a 
result of the system complexity, harsh 
corrosive environment, and toxicity 
or corrosiveness of the propellants 
(Figure 5). These servicing 
challenges could be magnified for in-
space servicing operations unless 
efforts to address the problems are 
consciously considered in the system 
design phase.   
The external thermal protection 
systems were also a major source of work, requiring not only tile repair, but rework of thermal barriers for outer mold 
line penetrations and various mechanically operated doors, hatches, and probes. Also included in this type of work 
were fabrication, repair and re-installation of payload bay liners. 
The reconfiguration of the payload from the previous mission to the next mission also entailed a great deal of 
customized work. Work involved removal of any returned cargo, disassembly and relocation of support structure, 
relocation of electrical services, payload installation, thermal protection closeout, and so forth. The crew cabin 
accommodations and airlock/hatch arrangement were also at times reconfigured.  
Beyond the planned work and the SSME, tile, and payload reconfiguration operations, a great deal of unplanned 
troubleshooting and repair work would arise from functional failures detected during both flight and ground operation, 
as well as through the required inspection procedures. On average, over 100 Line Replaceable Units —excluding 
SSMEs, tile, and payload cargo items—would require replacement each turnaround. Replacements resulted from: a 
failure detected during flight operation (~10% of replacements); failure detected during a planned functional 
verification, or replaced as a known life-limited item (~40% of replacements); or, failures detected during the normal 
course of conducted ground operations (50% of replacements), such as an Orbiter avionics box failing during a payload 
test. 
Shuttle turnaround operations were analyzed across eight flights that launched in 1997. A summary of direct work 
volume concentrations is included in the pie charts of Figure 6.11 The chart does not include indirect work activity, 
such as offline engine repair. Also note that “processing support” work included work required in support of other 
operations. For instance, manning of avionics stations in support of propulsion system checkout, or hydraulic 
operations to move a surface for tile repair.   
Figure 5. Summary of the problem reports from the final 41 Space Shuttle 
launch pad processing flows. 
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As can be seen, the Space Shuttle Orbiters required an extensive amount of tear down and effort in order be readied 
for the next mission, which will not be a viable solution for in-space reusable assets.  It is important to note, however, 
that a significant portion of the work is specific to the Orbiter’s systems and operating environment, such as the thermal 
system, which had to protect the vehicle during reentry, and the SSME’s, which had to push the Space Shuttle through 
launch. Additionally, the pre-launch environment, launch loads, and reentry stresses repeatedly experienced by the 
Orbiter far exceed that which an in-space transportation systems will encounter, therefor servicing requirements for 
in-space systems should also not be as extensive for the Space Shuttle. Despite these differences, there is still value in 
the many lessons learned from the years of Space Shuttle servicing and operation, which can be used to inform future 
vehicle designs and operations in an effort to drive less complex, more readily serviceable systems.  
  
2. Robotic Systems 
Progress has being made with autonomous and teleoperated in-space robotic 
assets that can perform servicing and maintenance tasks needed for reusability. 
Several robotic arms have been utilized on the Space Shuttle Orbiter and on ISS 
that have or are currently demonstrating functionality to maneuver spacecraft, 
manipulate components, and position and stabilize crew, including the Special 
Purpose Dexterous Manipulator, also known as Dextre, that was used to 
manipulate the RRM Module during the RRM (Figure 7). Small robots such as 
NASA’s Autonomous Extravehicular Activity Robotic Camera (AERCam)12, a 
free-flying platform capable of obtaining difficult to reach camera views that 
was demonstrated on STS-87, provide utility to support in-space inspection and 
recertification. Since 2011, the humanoid robot, Robonaut 2 (R2), has been 
aboard the ISS demonstrating tasks that support crew inside the station13. R2 can be operated from Earth by ground 
controllers or by an astronaut on station through teleoperation. Future upgrades will enable demonstration and testing 
of extravehicular tasks. Both intra- and extravehicular activities are similar to those anticipated for facilitating vehicle 
reusability. 
Figure 7.  The Special Purpose 
Dexterous Manipulator on ISS. 
Figure 6. Space Shuttle Orbiter turnaround work volume concentrations by A) general function and B) systems variety. 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
12 
 
3. Hubble Space Telescope 
NASA has gained experience both in the design of a serviceable 
spacecraft and in successfully servicing spacecraft through the Hubble 
servicing missions.  The Hubble Space Telescope was intentionally 
designed to accommodate modular upgrades and regular, periodic, 
servicing by astronaut crews.14  Instruments and components were 
modular and designed to be replaced as a unit, used standardized fittings, 
and were accessible to extravehicular astronauts. In addition to the 
servicing missions, the Hubble also incorporated redundancy and safe 
mode systems to facilitate reaching its 15-year planned lifetime. The 
servicing missions addressed three scenarios: technological upgrades, 
planned replacement of degraded components, and unplanned 
replacement due to equipment failure or malfunction (Figure 8). Although 
the Hubble design attempted to plan ahead to address part replacements, there were several items that had to be 
removed and replaced that were not originally meant to be replaced.  These required the fabrication of special tools 
and very intricate extravehicular operations. 
 
4. 3-D Printing Technology 
3-D printing is an emergent technology that is beginning to see use in Earth-based manufacturing of spacecraft 
parts and developing capabilities for in-space manufacturing.  NASA and ESA have both tested ground-manufactured 
engine components such as thrust chambers and nozzles, and commercial companies have successfully incorporated 
3-D printed parts into flown launch vehicles and satellites. Initial experiments of 3-D printing hardware on the ISS 
have demonstrated the ability to successfully print low-temperature plastic parts in a micro-gravity environment.  
V. Considerations Impacting Reusability 
Several factors affect the reusability of a system and the feasibility of incorporating reusability in to a mission 
architecture. This section will address system design factors associated with reusability, design considerations and 
constraints that tend to create operational tasks, and mission considerations. NASA is conducting early investigations 
into cis-lunar proving ground test and demonstration environments to discover when, and in what subsystem functions, 
the reset requirements will tend to accumulate. With such experience, developers can make informed design decisions 
to increase the degree of reusability of operational systems and more effectively incorporate highly autonomous 
systems, algorithms, and procedures to expedite the turnaround of Mars campaign elements. 
A. Design Factors 
Certain factors impact the capabilities needed by a reusable system beyond the types of reset activities the vehicle 
will encounter. As has been previously discussed, designs for reusable systems should strive to retain functional 
integrity to the greatest feasible extent during vehicle turnaround, within the constraints of available technologies and 
added system mass. Additionally, the desired system lifetime, location where the reset will occur, and the need to 
access subsystems and components that need servicing influence design decisions and affect the degree of reusability 
that can reasonably be achieved. 
 
1. Desired System Lifetime 
System lifetime, or number of mission cycles, is a determining factor for many system design decisions ranging 
from material selection and technology choices to subsystem replacement strategy. A higher degree of reuse that 
comes closer to the Vision outlined above may be more achievable over shorter durations and fewer cycles. There are 
multiple options for extending the life of a system so that it can operate for longer periods before retirement or 
overhaul. The primary options include designing built-in fault tolerance, planned routine replacement, or development 
of new or improved components with longer life. 
Some degree of fault tolerance is typically designed into any spacecraft. Fault tolerance may incorporate 
redundancy, replication, and diversity to ensure a system will continue operating after a component failure. 
Redundancy involves designing in similar or dissimilar redundancy and having the subsystems pre-integrated into the 
vehicle from the outset. Units can either be cycled to share the operating time, or else the redundant units are kept 
dormant until the primary unit fails. Replication is similar to redundancy in that multiple identical units are installed 
in the system, but the units all run concurrently in parallel and performance of the units is checked against one another 
Figure 8. Crew perform maintenance 
during Hubble servicing mission. 
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for fault detection.  Diversity incorporates dissimilar systems providing the same capabilities in the same manner as 
replication. These methods are useful for components that are not expected to undergo significant technological 
development over the life of the vehicle. Some level of fault tolerance may be required for critical systems, and for 
those subsystems or components that will be inaccessible. Different degrees of fault tolerance are designed into a 
system depending on the system’s criticality. The degree of fault tolerance that can be built into a system depends on 
the mass and volume associated with installing the additional components and the overall planned lifetime of the 
system.   
The mass of carrying multiple units, and associated logistics burdens, would be carried throughout the entire 
lifetime of the vehicle. Failed units would not nominally need to be replaced unless the failure was early, unexpected 
and potentially indicative of a larger systemic problem. For shorter durations or fewer number of use-cycles, it may 
be feasible to design in enough fault tolerance to satisfy the needs of the entire planned system lifetime without having 
to make repairs.  As lifetime durations extend, the number of units necessary to make a fully-fault tolerant subsystem 
(i.e., one for which you would not repair system faults or replace failed units) would grow to exceed reasonable mass 
and volume limits. Additionally, the accumulation of parts in the overall design may increase the odds of part failures 
between flights if overall design durability and life objectives are not also increased.  Therefore, another approach, 
such as planned replacement or increased design life and quality, will be necessary.  A process for developing and 
balancing safety, reliability, and maintainability requirements is available to mathematically explore these 
relationships.15  
Planned routine replacement involves scheduled replacement of units based on expected mean time between 
failures, much like automobile maintenance today. An appropriate number of spares would need to be kept onboard 
to cover the routine replacements and any contingencies for the mission, and a new stock of spares would be delivered 
on the resupply between uses.  Therefore the mass of the units carried is reduced compared to a fully redundant option. 
Any item that will be routinely replaced, however, should be readily accessible, which will impact the vehicle design.  
Routinely replaced elements that are not accessible will require more time to effect repairs, and getting to them may 
disrupt or damage other systems. Planned routine replacement is particularly useful for items that undergo potentially 
rapid technological advances, for example computers and avionics, where it may be advantageous to be able to 
incorporate upgrades from mission to mission as they become available. 
Repeated system development cycles, whether re-engineering existing components or developing new 
technologies, may be the only feasible means of achieving the required lifetimes, particularly as system lifetimes 
extend from years to decades. An example is materials that cannot be readily replaced, such as embedded valves and 
seals in engines and fuel lines. Even with fault tolerance and planned replacement, components and subsystems will 
benefit from these development cycles to increase their lifetime and reliability. In some cases, longer 
subsystem/component lifetimes are necessary to enable a fault tolerant or planned replacement strategy (e.g., when 
you would otherwise have to carry too many spares to achieve the desired lifetime).  The cost, schedule, and risk 
associated with an additional development cycle must be weighed against and the expected benefits to determine 
whether the overall improvement to the vehicle (e.g., reduction in mass carried) exceeds the cost, time required, and 
risk associated with the development. If not, then an alternative design solution may be necessary. 
 
2. System Reset Location 
A system near Earth is easier to reset than a system at Mars because of proximity. Time delays are shorter, which 
makes communication with a servicing crew and ground operation of robotic assets more effective and allows for a 
more rapid response during contingencies. Reduced transit times, days vs. months or years, enable the ability to more 
quickly deliver replacement parts, and potentially send a servicing crew, if an unexpected failure occurs. Furthermore, 
resupply will be easier the nearer the system is to the origin of the resupply, and currently all resupply is provided 
from Earth. Systems that must be reset on Mars may require different design decisions and incorporate different 
lifetime strategies than systems that return to Earth for reset. Systems being reset at Mars will also benefit from 
capabilities that come closer to achieving the ideal Vision for Reusability outlined above. As the capabilities for 
acquiring resupply from in-situ sources and manufacturing parts in space are developed, the location of the system 
during reset will become less of a factor. 
 
3. Accessibility  
Subsystems and components that will need routine servicing or repair will benefit by being readily accessible. This 
factor influences design decisions such as configuration and layout, and may also impact selection of the subsystems 
or components. Providing accessibility to components can also reduce or eliminate to need to remove other 
components and disturb the functional integrity of neighboring subsystems.  
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
14 
Standardized fittings can facilitate part replacement when necessary. In addition to making components accessible, 
any system that will require extravehicular servicing should incorporate design features such as hand holds and foot 
restraints for crew, as well as power and data receptacles for robotic assets. 
B. Controlling Operational Tasks 
Each task created takes time to perform (whether in the critical path or not), labor (if not performed in a fully 
autonomous manner), material, and equipment. This resulting volume of work and accumulation of support systems 
and equipment can be controlled by understanding required, or planned, tasks needed by the system; and also by 
considering how unplanned troubleshooting and repair tasks can be controlled.  
 
1. Controlling Planned Work during Spacecraft Resets in Space—By Design 
Superimposing a very high-level vehicle-system breakdown with a similarly high-level breakdown of generic 
functions can give the conceptual designer a sense of what tasks may or may not be required to reset the vehicle and 
its systems. These can then be explored in more detail to see how much of the accumulation of these tasks can be 
reduced and controlled by design. The key, of course, is a simple design that avoids as many generic functions as 
practicable while retaining the performance required of the mission (Vision Point #1). Once analyzed, the tasks that 
remain can be sequenced with probabilities for time and resource levels estimated to accomplish each planned task.   
 
2. Controlling Unplanned Work during Spacecraft Resets in Space—By Design 
One generic function included in Figure 1 is unplanned repair. Vision Point #2 stresses designing to reduce or 
eliminate unplanned reset work. Time and resources may be allocated for repair, but the level of repair is largely 
unknown until the system is fielded—preferably during dedicated full-scale test and demonstration programs 
replicating the pace envisioned and the infrastructure to be drawn upon.  
Specific repair tasks can be difficult to accommodate, let alone predict, in a planned routine. The reason for this 
can be seen by breaking down a typical repair activity on a space vehicle element: 
 
 Identify and troubleshoot a functional failure 
 Safe or configure the area to be accessed and gain access (either to further troubleshoot, or to get to the 
problem component(s); this will likely destroy the integrity of many functions just to perform these tasks 
 Remove and replace the failed component 
 Reconnect any disconnected components 
 Retest the function prior to closeout 
 Closeout the repaired area which was intruded into 
 Final functional check-out to verify repair 
 
If the component is accessible, a simple mold line panel, or otherwise externally accessible component will negate 
or highly alleviate the work involved with these sub-functions. However, if surrounded by many components and 
obstructions, the work involved can cause a lot of collateral removals, and possibility of damage, resulting in even 
more unplanned activity. 
For unplanned troubleshooting and repair tasks, not only are there probabilities associated with task times and 
resource levels, there are probabilities of whether these operations occur at all, and to what degree. For this reason, 
mature commercial and military transportation systems include “type” certifications for the operational readiness of 
the system to determine this very effect. While flight-by-flight certifications (provided by flight readiness reviews) 
were conducted for each flight, this one-time “type” certification was never considered appropriate for the reusable 
Space Shuttle.16 This distinction is similar to the difference in turnaround requirements between experimental aircraft 
and commercial jetliners. Again, the space flight proving ground approach could address continuous improvement of 
system dependability and dramatically reduce unplanned troubleshooting and repair work by design, thus providing 
improved operational readiness for effective, affordable, dependable Mars campaigns (Vision Point #5). Note that 
even though even though unplanned events may be significantly reduced, the unforgiving nature of the space 
environment means that unforeseen contingencies will likely never be completely eliminated, and vigilance will need 
to be maintained to detect unanticipated failures. 
C. Mission Factors 
Mission factors affecting reusability typically fall into two categories: time and workforce. The decision to 
incorporate reusability must consider the time required to refurbish and restock the system between uses against the 
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time available, which is governed by the arrival and departure windows of the preceding and upcoming missions. 
Even for low delta-V missions to Mars where the alignment dictates a cadence of no more than one mission use for 
every two Mars transit opportunities, long transits between arrival orbit and cis-lunar servicing orbit limit available 
reset time. Time available is also dependent on the timely arrival of the resupply and servicing flights, which is 
influenced by the available trajectory options and propulsion system decisions. Trajectory decisions balance on the 
amount of time it takes for the servicing vehicles to reach the transportation stack and the delta-v required for the 
trajectory. If a solution is not found that fits in both the time and delta-V budgets, then resupply from Earth may not 
be possible and another alternative will be necessary. 
Available workforce for performing reset activities includes both human crew and robotic assets. A dependence 
on one or the other may limit the types of reset activities that can be performed. Human crews may be able to perform 
tasks more quickly, but they will need logistics support during the servicing mission and they will have a limited 
amount of time available. Additionally, some tasks, such as refuel of hazardous propellants or maintenance in the 
vicinity of the large solar arrays, may be deemed unacceptably risky for humans to perform when weighed against the 
criticality of the task for successful completion of the mission, particularly if other, non-human assets can be provided 
that can perform the task. In the past there have been times, such as with the human-performed repair of an ISS solar 
array, where the criticality of the task made the level of risk to the crew acceptable17. 
Robotic assets may have more available time if they reside with the reusable system, but they may be more limited 
in the types of tasks they can perform. For remote reusable systems, however, such as those on the surface of Mars, 
robotic assets may be the only way to maintain and prepare systems for the next mission. It is highly likely that both 
on-site and remote crews will have to be looked upon more extensively to effectively complete the necessary reset 
operations. A balance needs to be struck to efficiently perform all the necessary reset tasks in the time available to 
ensure the vehicle is ready for the next missions. Workforce limitations can also be mitigated by incorporating greater 
levels of autonomy, which is consistent with Vision Point #4.   
VI. Capability Needs and Challenges with Reusability 
1. Architectural Need and Reusable System Goals 
The goal for incorporating reusability into an architecture is to produce highly affordable and productive space-
based vehicles and support elements that are needed for achieving the end vision of an Evolvable Mars Campaign. 
Reusable system goals involve responsive operations with simplified in-space turnaround times (reset time) for the 
elements involved. Additionally, safe flight operations are mandatory, and hardware and software reset processes must 
be dependably repeatable with predictable turnaround times (Vision Point #5). Flexible configurations are also needed 
with an optimum degree of commonality to effectively conduct the wide array of EMC missions and affordably acquire 
the elements. Commonality and higher element utilization will not only demand reusability as the capability evolves 
and is sustained, but has the potential of lowering production unit costs, recurring ground and mission operations costs, 
and fixed logistical support costs by avoiding custom one-off designs for commonly performed functions. 
 
2. Reusable System Challenges 
There are challenges associated with achieving these reusability goals, but all can be overcome with appropriate 
engineering attention, technical innovation, and the patience to prove out reusability in the proving ground of near-
Earth and cis-lunar space environments. 
First there is the challenge of creating simplified reusable vehicles with little or no propulsive element staging, and 
thus, little or no resulting vehicle re-assembly and integration between missions. Simplified elements with a low 
number of subsystems are required to reduce design and development work for mission and support systems, as well 
as the recurring assembly, servicing, checkout, and repair activities. The simpler the element design, the easier it is to 
build and operate. The subsystems of these elements must be designed carefully to avoid—by design—unintentional 
or intentional disconnections or disassembly to avoid an over-accumulation of reset tasks. A balance must be 
maintained between the simplicity of the design and additional risk introduced by oversimplifying the design to the 
point where sufficient redundancy is lost or essential functionality is not adequately provided. System degradation 
between missions and the reuse life of the vehicle must also take into account system degradation in the various 
environments the system will encounter—including the reset environment itself. 
Addressing the challenge of simplification should also result in another required characteristic of highly reusable, 
operable systems; that is a very low number of element servicing interfaces to avoid an over-accumulation of support 
service hookups and the resulting footprint residing at the aggregation points and destinations. Infrastructure that 
improves productivity is desired. Added infrastructure that does not improve the pace of EMC operations will become 
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a burden.  Therefore, greater automation and reduced need for manual assembly, servicing, and repair will also be a 
desired capability for a more responsive and repeatable reset process. 
Propulsion systems designed with high operating margins are needed to avoid inspections, teardowns, and 
replacements that result from a lack of engineering confidence in the hardware. Reusable elements that design in high 
operating margins are far more likely to retain full functional integrity between mission cycles and demonstrate with 
confidence that they can be reused without such intrusive activity. A challenge will be in achieving sufficiently high 
margins without incurring excessive element mass and cost increases and unacceptable architecture performance 
impacts. 
Reusability can be enabled if flight elements are easily evolvable to ISRU dependence for refueling and resupply. 
This will also help add inherent design and operating margin to the various elements and the robustness of the 
campaigns. 
 
3. Technical Capabilities 
The EMC concepts of hybrid chemical/electric propulsion systems18 will require large-scale, high kilowatt power 
systems, which in turn require highly capable thermal management and control systems. Creating highly dependable, 
simple to service thermal control systems, which at these scales tend to have many active components and serviceable 
fluid commodities, is a needed capability for reusable in–space designs. Reusable, long-life solar arrays will also be 
needed, along with dependable high power electric thrusters. The low power thrusters have demonstrated thousands 
of hours of service life. These desirable reusability characteristics need to be demonstrated at the scale of human-
capable propulsion systems. 
Whereas in-space transfer of hypergolic propellants has been performed on a small scale, the high-volume, in-
space transfer of a variety of both chemical and EP propellants are needed capabilities that have yet to be fully 
developed. Along with the technical performance characteristics of the system in operation, the availability of EP 
propellant, in particular, should be followed through the supply chain throughout its life cycle. For example, the 
amount of propellant needed in the supply chain rarely equals exactly that consumed during flight. The amount 
required during development, qualification and acceptance testing, and demonstration flight tests must be taken into 
account, and losses in the support systems and the many equipment transfers should also be considered. Highly 
autonomous propellant management systems are also needed to demonstrate easy-to-operate/automate in situ support 
elements of the EMC architecture. 
VII. Reusability in the Hybrid Propulsion System Architecture 
A. Architecture Description 
An investigation into the implications and feasibility of incorporating 
reusability into a specific mission architecture was performed on the EMC 
Hybrid architecture. The Hybrid was chosen because the mission design 
enables round trip missions to Mars and recapture back at Earth without 
staging any part of the transportation system.  Additionally, all fuel required 
for the mission is onboard at Earth departure, allowing for all reset 
operations to be performed in cis-lunar space.19 The in-space transportation 
system for the Hybrid architecture combines chemical and solar electric 
propulsion systems into a single stage. The GRC COMPASS team, in 
collaboration with the authors, developed concepts for both a Hybrid 
propulsion stage (HPS) (Figure 9) and a refueling tanker to resupply the HPS 
with fuel (see Section VII.B.1.a below).  The concept is based off currently 
available components where possible and is limited to supporting three 
missions to Mars, with element lifetime of approximately 15 years.   
The chemical propulsion system for this concept uses hypergolic 
bipropellant (MMH and NTO) and leverages existing technologies rated for 
the demands of 3 round trip Mars missions, including the Aerojet R-42 
engine. The SEP component of the concept uses components developed and 
tested on the Asteroid Redirect Mission SEP stage.20 In order to provide 
enough power for the vehicle end of life at Mars distance, the solar arrays 
are sized to provide 435 kWe of power at 1 AU at beginning of life (BOL). The spacecraft is still power limited even 
at this power level and would benefit from more array power.  The electric propulsion system is made up of 24 strings 
including power processing units, xenon feed systems, and magnetically shielded hall thrusters that utilize a combined 
Figure 9. Hybrid propulsion stage 
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input power of approximately 318 kW and can operate in high Isp (~3000s) or low Isp (~2000s) modes. In the 
architecture, the HPS concept is used for both crew and cargo missions to minimize the number of unique elements.  
It is sized to deliver the EMC in-space habitat concept (41.5 t) round trip, and is able to deliver the EMC 18t payload 
lander concept (43.6 t) and return without a payload for less than the maximum propellant load.21,22   
The HPS is deployed for use via an SLS block 2 to trans-lunar injection (TLI) to a lunar gravity assist (LGA) in 
order to minimize array degradation due to the Van Allen Belts.  From there the HPS flies on a ballistic lunar transfer 
(BLT) to cis-lunar space (lunar distant retrograde orbit, LDRO) in order to minimize fuel requirements.23  The HPS is 
then refueled in cis-lunar space (LDRO) and prepared for its mission.  The propellant required for the mission is 
supplied by a tanker module that is launched to rendezvous with the HPS in cis-lunar space. It carries a combination 
of hypergolic bi-propellant and xenon.  The specific ratio of each fuel type is dependent on the HPS concept and the 
maximum payload is limited by the SLS block 2 throw capability.  The current concept can delivery up to 10t 
hypergolic bi-propellant and 35 t of xenon in a combination that does not exceed 39 t.  
After checkout, fueling, and logistics supply, the HPS and payload transfer to a lunar-distance high Earth orbit 
(LDHEO) for rendezvous with the crew prior to departure.  Cargo-only missions do not require return to a specific 
LDHEO. Rather, they can depart with a BLT, which increases their energy with respect to the Moon, and then perform 
a series of LGA that propel the spacecraft to a C3 = 2 km2/s2 with the correct declination for a transit to Mars. To 
complete a mission to Mars, cargo transit stages return to a LDRO after delivering cargo to the Mars sphere of 
influence, crew transit stages return to LDHEO to rendezvous with Orion and drop off returning crew prior to transiting 
to LDRO for resupply and refurbishment. 
 A high-level depiction of the reset operations phase is depicted in Figure 10. With currently assessed trajectories, 
the time available for the reset phase ranges from ~415-600 days, although this also includes transit time between 
LDHEO and LDRO, which could account for as much as 400 of those available days. 
B. Discussion 
The major functions necessary to prepare the transportation stage for reuse, referring back to Figure 1, are 
propellant replenishment; refurbishment and repair, to include planned component replacement; addressing 
malfunctions and replacement of failed components; and functional verification. Additionally, some degree of safing 
and assembly and handling may be required depending on specific design and operations decisions. The study effort 
to date has been primarily focused on developing approaches to deal with propellant replenishment, as addressed in 
the following sections.  
 
1. Fuel Resupply 
For a propulsion stage that will be used for multiple missions, the most critical function is the ability to be 
resupplied with propellant and other operational fluids and gasses.  Within the HPS architecture, two options are being 
Figure 10. High-level depiction of mission con-ops for preparing crew transit stack for reuse. 
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traded for resupplying propellants: a refuel tanker and a dockable tank module. Both options have advantages and 
bring their own challenges. 
 
a) Refuel Tanker 
The refuel tanker is currently conceived of as a single-use spacecraft carrying 
propellant as payload that is able to transfer and maneuver itself from some 
initial Earth orbit to a rendezvous with the HPS in LDRO (Figure 11). The tanker 
concept assumes transfer of chemical propellants using pumps located on the 
hybrid stage and uses low-pressure, passive transfer of xenon and helium from 
tanker to hybrid stage, followed by compression on the hybrid stage. A refuel 
tanker represents a higher degree of reusability than the tank module option in 
that 1) it is closer to a “pump-and-go” resupply capability and 2) it potentially 
reduces the amount of disposed hardware (e.g., if the tanker can be reused). 
Chemical refueling of both hydrazine and NTO has been demonstrated in 
space and is frequently performed on ISS by the Russians. Although the specific 
method of transfer to employ between the tanker and hybrid module may differ, 
there is high confidence that this will be a relatively straightforward operation 
to accomplish. However, the use of NTO and the negative effects it has on 
valves, seals, and other engine and propellant feed system components can 
impact the long-term reusability and lifetime of the propulsion system. 
Additional concerns include propellant toxicity and the potential for leakage and 
contamination, which provide a serious hazard to humans and could factor into 
servicing.  
SEP xenon refuel in space is a capability in the early stages of development. Tight temperature and flow-rate 
tolerances that are imposed on transfer during ground servicing will also apply in space in order to maintain xenon in 
a supercritical state. This drives the time required to transfer the propellant and adds complexity to the system. 
Cryogenically-stored xenon may provide an alternative, but the cryogenic systems add complexity and mass, and 
additional developments would be required to enable the capability. 
For both chemical and SEP systems, it will be infeasible to completely deplete the refuel tanker’s supply tanks 
according to known methods, so there will be excess fluids that are not transferred. For pressure-fed transfer of storable 
chemical propellants using bellows, such as used for ISS, as well as for gasses this could be as much as 50% of the 
tanker capacity.  This excess amount can be reduced by incorporating pumps and compressors, as on the current tanker 
concept.  In order to avoid a high-pressure gas/fluid transfer interface between the tanker and transit stage, however, 
the pumps will need to be carried on the transit stage, adding mass and complexity, and introducing potential failure 
point that could affect the future servicing needs of the spacecraft.  
In addition to propellants, pressurant must also be replenished. Pressurant refill is very challenging in space. In 
order to boost the pressure of one gaseous helium (GHe) tank into another, an elaborate compressor and thermal 
system will need to be designed, and maintenance of such system introduces additional complexity into refurbishment 
activities. Alternative solutions could eliminate the need for such complexity. For example, qualifying a GHe tank for 
the tanker to a much higher than normal pressure, perhaps 8000 or 10,000 psi and fill the client GHe tank through an 
orifice and isolation valve until the tank pressures are balanced. This will result in some GHe waste on the tanker side, 
but could enable a simpler transfer system and operation.  Alternatively, the GHe tank on the hybrid vehicle could be 
oversized so that it contains sufficient pressurant to meet anticipated needs over the life of the vehicle. This can add 
considerably more mass and volume requirements to the hybrid vehicle, however. 
Another hurdle will be refurbishment and repair of HPS modules designated to carry cargo and other uncrewed 
systems. Within the current architecture, crew are not available to facilitate servicing these systems, so a means must 
be provided to enable component replacement and other repair work. While robotics can provide the necessary 
manipulation capability, servicing systems will need to either operate autonomously or else be teleoperated by ground 
personnel from Earth. Autonomous servicing capabilities under development are beginning to be realized, but are still 
limited. Missions like Orbital Express demonstrated that it is possible to plan and execute autonomous replacement 
of some components, if the serviced spacecraft is designed to facilitate access to those parts. Identifying and planning 
for these operations in the development stage could lead to capabilities to directly address the challenges with remote 
servicing, and knowledge of other potential component access and replacement needs will inform the development of 
other robotic and autonomous capabilities. Teleoperation can supplement autonomous operations, although the time 
delay from Earth can make such operations challenging. Given currently available capabilities, the ability to remotely 
service uncrewed assets will be limited. Having crew available in the near term to perform or support servicing tasks 
Figure 11. Refuel tanker servicing 
hybrid transit vehicle. 
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opens up the possibility of performing much more extensive maintenance and the ability to address a wider variety of 
unplanned repairs and contingencies. Crew operations not already associated with a planned Mars mission may be 
quite expensive to conduct, however, and this may offset the advantages of reuse. The trade to balance crew operations, 
robotic operations, and degree of reuse is a trade that will need to be conducted. 
 
b) Fuel Tank Module 
Replaceable, mountable tank modules are an alternative to refueling. 
Instead of transferring propellant from a tanker to the HPS propellant 
tanks, modules containing empty propellant tanks on the HPS are removed 
and replaced (Figure 12). Depending on design, one or more tank modules 
can be used. In the current concept, two modules are included. Each tank 
module is identical, and contains both SEP and chemical propellant tanks, 
pressurant tanks, an interface for mating with and connecting the 
propellant supply to the core vehicle, and may also include any limited-
life components designated for planned replacement.  The core vehicle 
would house the reciprocal interface, accumulator tanks, the propellant 
feed system, and the thrusters. All major power system components would 
also reside on the core vehicle. A separable service module, or tug, 
transfers each tank module from launch through rendezvous and mating. 
Mating may occur via berthing or autonomous docking. If berthing, one 
of the vehicles will need to provide a robotic manipulator. The tug would 
also facilitate removal and disposal of expended modules. The modules 
could use the same mating interface as the refuel tanker, although some additional structural stabilization may be 
required to support the modules during transit, and a second interface would be needed if two modules are used to 
balance center of gravity, as with the current concept.   
Because a substantial portion of the vehicle is replaced with each mission, thus breaking the functional integrity 
of the propellant system, the modular concept represents a lower degree of reusability than refueling. Consideration 
must be given to the multiple interface connections that would be required. Advancing capabilities can simplify these 
interfaces, but some degree of built in tolerance or compliance will likely be needed to facilitate the mechanical 
mating. Additionally, each fluid connection will need to be verified and leak checked following mating before 
operations commence.  
Tank modules, however, are more attainable with current technologies. They do not depend on more advanced 
capabilities associated with refueling, and can overcome several of the challenges presented by using a refuel tanker, 
such as thermal management of the propellants during transfer. Furthermore, there is less likelihood of waste from 
nontransferable propellant. Once attached, the tank modules become part of the propellant feed system. Propellants 
and pressurant are transferred to the core stage through a regulated, low-pressure interface, where they are collected 
into accumulator tanks, which then feed the engines.  
Tank modules also provide a ready solution to planned replacement or upgrading of life-limited components. 
Components are pre-integrated and functionally verified on the ground and interface with the core vehicle through a 
relatively simple connection, thereby maintaining a higher level of functional integrity than if removal and 
replacement was required. Furthermore, the core system does not need to be designed for accessibility in limited real 
estate, or need to provide a capability to facilitate swapping out the items telerobotically or autonomously. 
As currently conceptualized, the tank module concept will still have the same life-limiting concerns associated 
with the negative effects of NTO as the refuel tanker option for those parts of the system residing on the core module. 
Furthermore, while planned replacement of components is simplified with the modular approach, a means to deal with 
unanticipated failures and maintenance on the core stage must still be provided. A more thorough assessment of the 
ability to address these contingencies through redundancy or allowable degradation of capabilities, and an assessment 
of the availability of greater servicing capabilities in line with recent servicing demonstrations has yet to be performed. 
 Despite the lesser degree of reusability initially attained, the lower apparent development needs for incorporating 
tank modules into the HPS architecture can lead to greater degrees of reusability over time. Designing in a capability 
for the tug to draw propellant from the tank modules could facilitate a more fully reusable architecture by extending 
the operational life of the tug, thus allowing it to return expended modules and rendezvous with additional logistics 
or tanker modules for delivery to the transit stack. If tank modules could be returned to Earth or to space-based 
infrastructure for refurbishment and refueling, they could also potentially see reuse for multiple missions. 
 
Figure 12. Tank module concept for 
propellant replenishment. 
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2. High-Power Solar-Electric System 
In addition to the propulsion systems, the high-power solar-electric system on the hybrid module provides a 
significant potential to affect the reusability of the system. Although the ability to refuel the propulsion stage is critical 
for mission-to-mission reuse, the most critical driver for HPS lifetime given the current design may be the solar arrays. 
The power derived from the solar arrays directly impacts travel times to Mars. In order to maintain reasonable trip 
times to Mars for the crew the arrays must provide a minimum level of power, although cargo missions can still be 
performed at lower power levels. Since solar arrays degrade with exposure to the space environment, the array design 
must be sized large enough at beginning of life to retain sufficient power at the end of life.  The mass associated with 
larger arrays, including the mass of the power management and distribution system needed to handle the maximum 
power provided by those arrays, can increase quickly as power levels increase, so a balance must be struck between 
the BOL power provided and the serviceable years that the system can provide. Furthermore, because of the size of 
the array wings and inherent danger of operating near high-power arrays, which can develop and carry a very large 
differential charge, the ability to service or replace array wings or associated components may be limited and very 
risky.  
Developments that can protect the arrays and reduce the rate of degradation will enable longer lifetimes for high-
powered solar systems. Another alternative to provide longer-life EP systems would be to replace solar power with 
nuclear power. Nuclear propulsion technologies are in development but may not be available for earlier missions. 
However, they do provide an option for when the desired system lifetime of high-powered systems can no longer be 
efficiently achieved with solar arrays. 
 Other power system components also present design considerations and could impact servicing and reusability of 
the system. Space Station experience with the Solar Array Rotary Joints has demonstrated that the long-term wear of 
mechanical components must be considered, and that a plan for periodic maintenance may be required. Also, 
consideration must be given to accessibility of components such as the power management and distribution systems 
and power processing units. These components typically have multiple connections, which complicates any 
replacement operations, especially if the parts are not easily accessible. With the collection of radiators, tanks, and 
fluid lines, it is all too possible for these components to become buried in the structure and be inaccessible for direct 
servicing unless their placement is consciously considered during the design phase or else sufficient redundancy is 
incorporated into the design to eliminate the need for servicing.  
 
3. Other Considerations 
Regardless of approach, the initial ability to repair the spacecraft will be limited by the ability to provide the right 
parts at the right time. Because of the distance from Earth to where servicing will occur and the time required to deliver 
repair parts, it will be critical to have early awareness of those components that may require replacement or repair. 
With current launch rates, even fast transits to rendezvous with the spacecraft will require some predictive capability 
to ensure the correct parts are on hand. Increasing use of integrated health monitoring and making use of flight or 
digital twin data can facilitate with predicting potential failures and planning for the servicing mission. In time, as the 
ability to stockpile or manufacture spare parts in space is developed, greater flexibility and responsiveness to repair 
needs can be achieved. Increasing launch availability and reducing payload preparation time on the ground, and 
continued development of in-space manufacturing technologies such as 3D printing, could enable a more rapid 
response capability to more readily address unanticipated repairs.  
Between lifetime limitations due to degradation and the pace of development that leads to the potential to upgrade 
capabilities over time; avionics, computers, other electronics, and batteries are primary candidates for planned 
replacement strategies. Incorporation of a standard interface would facilitate such a strategy by ensuring that new 
modules will readily fit into the system, if they are not replaced as part of a tank module. A further consideration, 
particularly with electronics and software, would be to make sure that the functionality of the new modules is 
compatible with, and does not interfere with, existing components. 
Structures will need to be robust to the longer durations in space, particularly if they will spend appreciable 
amounts of time in regions with high concentrations of micro-meteoroids and orbital debris. Current approaches for 
protection include adding shielding and overdesigning structures, both of which can add substantial mass as flight 
durations increase. Integrated structural health monitoring and self-healing capabilities can improve damage detection 
and tolerance, and reduce the additional mass required, which will facilitate longer lifetimes for system structures.  
Other subsystems have not been assessed at this time, but they will benefit from similar means to monitor and 
predict degraded performance and failure, and will have to make similar decisions regarding incorporating 
redundancy, planned replacement, and accessibility. 
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VIII. Making a Reusable Architecture a Reality 
It will take time to advance from the current paradigm of expendable systems to realizing the vision for reusability. 
New capabilities and technologies must be developed, demonstrated, and built upon to move beyond currently 
accepted operations. Without a systematic approach to development, campaigns will likely be limited to expendable 
sorties for some time. 
A logical, systematic approach to realizing a fully-reusable interplanetary transportation system begins by 
demonstrating critical capabilities needed by EMC systems, such as high-power SEP in the proving ground. Operating 
those demonstration systems will provide insight into system behavior and drive out points of failure that could impact 
reuse. Use the lessons learned to develop technologies and capabilities that increase reusability and serviceability, 
taking advantage of rapid development cycles to explore multiple options when possible, and incorporate the new 
capabilities into EMC system designs.  
Demonstrate the new capabilities and evaluate their performance through realistic operations in the proving 
ground, first on available systems such as initial cis-lunar habitation and transportation systems, and then with the first 
generation units of EMC mission vehicles. While designing for reusability, limit planned use of the first units of new 
EMC systems to a single mission that verifies the systems and servicing capabilities incorporated into the design. 
Identify modifications to better enable reusability in later system builds and future designs. Use of the proving ground 
should not cease once full operations on Mars have begun. Rather, the proving ground should continue to be used to 
flight test and evaluate new capabilities prior to deployment far from the Earth. Additionally, repurpose left-over 
hardware after servicing missions to build up infrastructure to support future missions and new opportunities and to 
provide platforms for demonstrating emerging capabilities as they are developed. 
Realizing a reusable architecture will take more than just a plan for developing and testing capabilities. The general 
mindset must also shift towards designing for reuse. Traditional design attempts to optimize for a primary mission of 
a certain duration, and makes certain design decisions as a result. As described in this paper, when designing for reuse, 
other factors influence design choices and different capabilities may be required. In order to facilitate this shift in 
mindset, the availability of inexpensive, rapid development methods are needed to more readily investigate promising 
new capability options. 
A shift is also needed towards more effectively leveraging the ingenuity, development capabilities, and competitive 
spirit of industry, academia, and international partners for developing the necessary capabilities to enable fully 
reusable architectures. By purchasing available capabilities, NASA provides an initial customer base that promotes a 
stronger economic motive for advancing pioneering efforts in space, and frees itself to focus internal development 
efforts on meeting the challenges of deep-space human spaceflight.   
In order to fully realize the benefits of reusability, the synergy between utilization of space resources and 
reusability must be understood and leveraged. The idea of utilizing space resources truly shows its value when 
combined with reusable systems and reusable infrastructure, and to obtain the maximum benefits from reusability, 
utilization of space resources is necessary. 
IX. Conclusion 
Although implementation of the vision of full reusability in space is not immediately possible, capabilities are 
currently available that enable designers to develop systems with a limited degree of reusability that will provide 
experience and knowledge on the path to the vision. Major challenges exist that will impact the ability to service and 
prepare systems for reuse, such as propellant refuel and the ability to remotely service uncrewed vehicles, particularly 
when dealing with unplanned repairs that exceed current autonomous or robotic capabilities. However, these 
challenges are currently being addressed by several ongoing development efforts, and several initial capabilities have 
already been demonstrated in space by both humans and robots. While incorporating higher levels of reusability is not 
a viable place to begin, available alternatives that have lower degrees of reusability can still benefit the architecture 
and need to remain in the decision space as they may be less risky or costly. 
Incorporating these existing capabilities into an EMC architecture lays a foundation for reusability that can be built 
upon by using the cis-lunar proving ground to evaluate the performance and reliability of reusable systems and 
demonstrate new capabilities to support reusability. As capabilities and experience grow through mission use and 
further proving ground demonstrations, greater degrees of reusability will be attainable and new opportunities for 
incorporating reusable systems and infrastructure will become available.   
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